

**Joint Chairmen's Report  
Teacher Development  
(R00A02.55 Page 107)**

**Final Report**



**Annapolis, Maryland  
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## Charge and Process

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### **Charge:**

On or before December 1, 2015, the Maryland State Department of Education (MSDE) is to submit a report to the budget committees on the proposed restructuring of fiscal incentive programs for educators. This report is to include:

- Review of best practices for administering fiscal incentive programs for educators;
- An evaluation of the current Quality Teacher Incentive program;
- An evaluation of any incentive programs piloted during the Race to the Top Grant;
- Two alternative proposals including the fiscal estimates for implementing them; and
- Any proposed statutory changes.

### **Process:**

In responding to the charge, MSDE examined the history of the Quality Teacher Incentive Act, national research reports and policy documents regarding best practices for educational fiscal incentives, existing state statute and regulations related to teacher incentive programs, the results of the Performance Compensation Workgroup that was required by the Race to the Top Grant, and other incentive programs that had been completed through Race to the Top.

As MSDE completed the research on this request, and through its work with the University System of Maryland, it became apparent that the High Quality Teachers (2015 JCR, p. 130, P-20 Council) and the Quality Teacher Incentives (2015 JCR, p. 107, MSDE) reports were linked by topic – high quality teachers. As such, MSDE and the University System of Maryland have been working together on this important issue and will be submitting a combined report, providing the committees with the information requested from the P-20 Task Force, such as best practices and professional development.

Together, MSDE and the University System of Maryland will provide the General Assembly with the recommendations and necessary information to make an informed decision on which option Maryland should pursue regarding the distribution of Quality Teacher Incentive funds.

## History of Quality Teacher Incentive Act

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The General Assembly passed the Quality Teacher Incentive Act (the “Act”) in 1999. These provisions are codified in Education Article (“ED”) §6-306. Over the years, the language of the statute has been amended several times. Pertinent changes included Senate Bill 268 *Education- School-Based Employees – Stipends* passed in 2005, the Budget Reconciliation and Financing Act (BRFA) of 2009 and the BRFA of 2015.

The General Assembly adopted the Act in 1999, with nearly unanimous support (Senate 44-3 and House 130-2). The Act represented an attempt by the Maryland General Assembly to address Maryland’s (and the nation’s) teacher shortage. As originally designed, the Act provided:

- Prospective teachers who achieved grade point averages of 3.5 and higher with financial incentives (\$1,000) for signing teaching contracts and remaining in the profession (in Maryland) for three years;
- Matching funds to local school systems to reward teachers who attain certification by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS);
- Stipends (\$2,000) for experienced teachers with Advanced Professional certification who teach in low-performing schools and state tax credit incentives (up to \$1,500) for tuition costs for teachers who pursue additional graduate education; and,
- For the mentoring of new teachers as well as the mentoring of non-tenured teachers who are having difficulty achieving tenure but who show promise.

Companion legislation provided matching funds to support teachers in their pursuit of NBPTS certification.

Senate Bill 268, introduced and passed during the 2005 legislative session, provided for the continuation of the original legislation’s intent of assisting local school systems with recruitment and retention of highly qualified teachers. Changes included amending the language pertaining to the identification of low-performing schools for stipend eligibility to be consistent with current regulatory terminology; increasing the limit on the number of teachers who may participate in the program of financial support for obtaining NBPTS certification; and extending the eligibility for participation from teachers only to include school-based certificated employees who work directly with students or teachers, including, library media specialists, reading specialists, guidance counselors, and teacher mentors.

The BRFA of 2009 was enacted to address the serious, fiscal impact on Maryland that was anticipated based on the implementation of No Child Left Behind (NCLB). The State recognized that it would be near impossible for all students to be proficient by end of the 2013-2014 school year as required by NCLB. Therefore most schools would be labeled in comprehensive

needs entitling almost all teachers to qualify for the stipend by that time. The change in law was to curtail some of the expected growth in the program.

It eliminated the signing bonus provision and stipulated that, beginning with stipends paid in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, the amounts for which teachers would be eligible would not be dependent upon the schools in which they teach. Additionally, BRFA also changed the stipends for teachers holding advanced professional certification and teaching in qualifying schools with satisfactory performance. School eligibility would be determined through Maryland's Differentiated Accountability model (comprehensive need schools). Finally, the amount of the stipend was reduced to \$1,500.

The BRFA of 2015 made additional changes to the incentives provided to teachers. Specifically, the BRFA eliminated, beginning in FY 2017, the stipend for a classroom teachers who hold an advanced professional certification and teach in a comprehensive needs school. It also capped the remaining stipends at FY 2014 levels stipends for the remaining teachers for FY 2016.

In its current form, the statute provides incentive grants to classroom teachers under three scenarios:

- 1) A "classroom teacher or other non-administrative school-based employee in a public school identified by the State Board as having comprehensive needs who holds a standard professional certificate or an advanced professional certificate, who is employed by a county board and who holds a certificate issued by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards shall receive a stipend from the State in an amount equal to the county grant for national certification, up to a maximum of \$2,000 per qualified individual." ED §6-306(b)(2).
- 2) A "classroom teacher or other non-administrative school-based employee in a school not identified by the State Board as having comprehensive needs who holds a standard professional certificate or an advanced professional certificate, who is employed by a county board and who holds a certificate issued by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standard shall receive a stipend from the State in an amount equal to the county grant for national certification, up to a maximum of \$1,000 per qualified individuals ." Md. Code Ann., §6-306(b)(3).
- 3) A "classroom teacher who holds an advanced professional certificate and teaches in a public school identified by the State Board as a school having comprehensive needs shall receive a stipend from the State in the amount of \$1,500 for each year that the teacher performs satisfactorily in the classroom." Md. Code Ann., Educ. §6-306(b)(4). This stipend is reduced from the \$2,000 when the law was originally passed.

It is important to note that ED §6-306(d) requires the employer of the individual who receives a stipend to pay the increase in fringe benefits costs associated with the stipend.

## Current Challenges of the Quality Teacher Incentive Act

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### Introduction:

While the Quality Teacher Incentive (QTI) Act was enacted to provide a good start to a comprehensive, competitive effort to attract and retain quality teachers in low performing schools, it did not take into account the variability in the identification of these schools based on changes to State-wide assessment requirements or the introduction of new college and career ready standards. As such, the funding for the QTI grants have substantially increased over the past five years, reaching an all-time high of \$21.8 million in FY 2015, representing a 192 percent increase from FY 2014 to FY 2015.

Secondly and equally concerning, in its current language the QTI Act has created a disincentive for improving school performance. Once a school is no longer designated as a “comprehensive needs” school, its teachers are no longer eligible to receive the stipend.

For these reasons and before making final recommendations for the best approaches to the QTI grants, we suggest that the Department, with input from a stakeholder group, be given an additional year to analyze the new assessment data, possibly leading to revisions in statutory language that would allow for increased flexibility in allocating the QTI grants. The P-20 Teacher Education Task Force report and JCR R75T00 Report address an array of opportunities for rethinking the return on investment of these QTI grants.

### Fiscal Costs of the Quality Teacher Incentive over the Past Six Years

Fiscal Year	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015
Amount	\$3,891,155	\$4,897,058	\$7,747,704	\$11,862,170	\$9,456,285	\$21,889,380

## **Maryland Incentive Programs Studied Through Race to the Top**

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### **Performance Compensation Workgroup**

#### **Introduction:**

As described in the Race to the Top (RTTT) grant, Maryland proposed to bring educators together, through the establishment of a Performance Compensation Workgroup, to investigate differentiated compensation models and to share lessons learned, ideas, and best practices on compensation for teachers and principals.

At that time, five local Maryland school systems (Anne Arundel, Montgomery, Prince George's, Queen Anne's, and Washington Counties) had experience in piloting or implementing new, differentiated compensation systems for teachers and principals. Taking advantage of this expertise, MSDE invited superintendents or designees, human resource officers, Maryland State Education Association (MSEA) representatives, and local employee representatives from the identified local school systems to serve as Maryland's Performance Compensation Workgroup. Researchers from the American Institutes for Research and the Mid Atlantic Comprehensive Center also provided support.

The workgroup, which began its work in 2011, was tasked to present different models to compensate teachers and principals based on performance/evaluation results, career points, leadership roles and subject-area content. The charge to the Workgroup was to identify ways to provide guidance and technical support to Maryland's local school systems interested in beginning conversations with their employee bargaining units around differentiated compensation models.

In addition to the five local school systems developing or implementing Performance Compensation Models in their counties, the Maryland State Education Association (MSEA) also provided their synopsis of a professional growth salary schedule. A summary of these models is found below.

#### **Anne Arundel County Public Schools (AACPS)**

AACPS provided information pertaining to four performance based compensation models used by their system. They included the Challenge Schools Performance Pay, Incentive/Performance Pay, Unit III Incentive Pay, and School Improvement Corrective Action Plan 2007-2008/Annapolis High School Continuing Achievement Plan. Plans specifically sought to recognize and reward individuals working in challenging schools, improve recruitment and retention, improve attendance and job performance, or to continue a specific school's achievement plan.

Pros identified in these four models included individuals volunteering to work at AACPS's most challenging schools, providing incentives to enhance performance, and helping promote employee commitment to the improvement of a struggling program. Significant costs and extensive staff time to administer were the top two cons reported with each of these programs.

### **Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS)**

MCPS provided information on the Career Lattice compensation program that they had developed. The purpose of the model was to expand opportunities for teacher leaders to design and implement projects in high needs schools and reward them for their work. Unfortunately, due to budget cuts and unpredictable funding needs, the program had not been implemented by 2011.

### **Prince George's County Public Schools (PGCPS)**

PGCPS provided information on the Financial Incentive Rewards for Supervisors and Teachers (FIRST) compensation model. FIRST was created as a voluntary pay for performance program providing financial awards to educators who were committed to continuous improvement and were willing to engage in the designated program activities designed to drive student achievement. Teacher participants could earn up to \$10,000 and administrators up to \$12,000 in incentive pay per year. Of the 42 high needs schools identified, 10-12 schools were phased into the program per year. Furthermore, extensive frameworks were developed outlining the requirements for earning the incentives.

PGCPS reported several benefits of this program including but not limited to increased collaboration between teachers around instruction to result in increased student achievement, a collective knowledge among teachers and administrators around instruction expectations, program flexibility, and increased quality of and opportunity for professional development. Cost, program management demands, and low participation presented the greatest challenges.

### **Queen Anne's County Public Schools (QACPS)**

QACPS implemented the Administrators Salary Compensation with Student Achievement Factor model. This model was designed to provide up to an additional 13 percent increase in salary to instructional facilitators, assistant principals, academic deans, instructional supervisors, and principals based on predetermined student achievement and other objectives/goals set by the Associate Superintendent and the Superintendent of Schools. The factors in percentage assignments were reached collaboratively with the Superintendent, the Associate Superintendent, and the employee.

The benefits of this model were reported as facilitating a collaborative effort between the Queen Anne's County Administrators and Supervisors Association and the Board of Education, providing a way of making them accountable for the performance of their schools.

Unfortunately, due to a data lag, QACPS found themselves halfway through the next school year before they could finalize a manager's salary. Manager's salaries could decrease from one



year to the next, which was not a generally accepted practice in education. Furthermore, teachers viewed the program negatively because it was perceived that managers were receiving a bonus based on the work the teachers were doing. Funding also was unable to be maintained. Since there was no definitive data that the plan had a positive effect and the funding had “dried up”, there were no plans to continue the model.

### **Washington County Public Schools (WCPS)**

WCPS provided information pertaining to three performance-based compensation models used by their system. They included the Teacher Leadership Responsibilities Program (TLRP), School Based Administrator & Supervisor, and POWER (Performance Outcomes With Effective Rewards). Each of these plans sought to reward teacher leadership, recognize the unique responsibilities of a school administrator based on the needs of the school community, and/or reward effective and highly effective teachers and school-based administrators teaching low income and disadvantaged students in high-needs schools or in hard-to-staff subjects.

Participants noted increased professional development, greater collaboration between teachers and administrators, recognition of the unique needs of individual school communities, and potential for developing teachers as leaders. Program administrators noted difficulty finding appropriate assessments to measure accurate student growth, difficulty determining teacher impact, that the program may result in a decreased salary from one year to the next potentially creating disparity between central office and school based administration, and teachers wanting to be compensated for doing “extra duties” instead of only those with leadership qualities.

## **Increasing the Equitable Distribution of Effective Teachers and Principals: Projects funded through Race to the Top**

### **Introduction**

To reduce the teacher quality gap among high-poverty and low-poverty schools, the State worked to identify the most effective educators and provide staffing reforms and recruitment efforts to encourage them to lend their talents to the neediest schools. Maryland also created targeted programs and incentives to increase the number of effective educators in these schools teaching in hard-to-staff areas, such as Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM), English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL), and special education.

### **Success funded by Race to the Top (RTTT)**

Four local school systems, provided a total of 413 incentives to shortage area teachers who had demonstrated the ability to significantly improve student academic performance and met the requirements of their local school systems’ project, as outlined in their approved applications

each year, encouraging the best STEM, ESOL, and special education teachers to begin or continue teaching in the State's low-achieving, high minority, high poverty - Tier III - schools.

Additionally, the participating local school systems provided a total of 322 incentives to teachers/principals who had demonstrated the ability to significantly improve student academic performance and who had met the requirements of their school systems' project, as outlined in their approved applications each year, retaining these highly effective teachers/principals as teachers in and/or leaders of the State's lowest-achieving schools.

Those highly effective teachers and principals who received incentives returned to their schools the following year, either because that is when they received their incentives, because it was a stipulation in the systems' application, or because the project was utilized to hire new teachers who began teaching in these schools the following year.

Finally, 501 content teachers who work in low-achieving, high-minority, high-poverty schools with significant number of English Language Learner (ELL) students received additional certification in ESOL.

### **Challenges**

One major challenge of these programs was the turnover of school system staff who worked on this project. While these changes in staff did not hinder the work of the project, it did take time for the new project managers to get up to speed with this work.

Another challenge for some school systems was the stipulation of the project that "local school system will be responsible for ensuring that the distribution of funds supports locally negotiated incentives." One school system had great difficulty developing a plan that their local bargaining unit would agree to, yet was also within the parameters of the project guidelines. To get their educator's association to sign off on their plan, this school system had to make extremely rigorous, intensive professional development the key piece of their project. At the end of the 2012-13 school year, the school system decided not to participate in the project again in Years 4 or 5 of Race to the Top.

Finally, the school systems faced challenges when it came to working with their local bargaining units to come to an agreement about what the project would require teachers to do and the amount of the incentive awarded to them. This caused delays in the school system's developing approvable project applications.

# Best Practices for Administering Fiscal Incentive Programs for Educators

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## Introduction

The current teacher pay system, steps and lanes, was established in 1921 at a time when equalizing salaries was the goal. (Delisio, 2015) Under President Nixon in the 1960s, and again under President Reagan in the 1980s, there were brief but unsuccessful attempts to introduce merit pay for teachers. (Gratz, 2009) Today, however, with the increased attention on student performance and the recruitment and retention of highly effective teachers on the forefront, school systems are being challenged to explore the introduction of pay for performance, fiscal incentive models again.

Currently, there are generally four alternative teacher compensation systems that are in use or being discussed throughout the education community. They include:

- Merit Pay: individual teachers receive bonuses based on improvements in their performance;
- Knowledge and Skills Based Pay: teachers can earn permanent increases for acquiring new skills;
- Performance Pay: teachers earn increases tied to improvements in student performance; and
- School-Based Performance Pay: all professional staff in a school earn a bonus if the school achieves its goals.

Examples of states that have piloted and/or revised their pay models include, but are not limited to, Arizona, Kentucky, and Maine.

## Arizona

In 2000, through proposition 301, Arizona authorized a .6 cent sales tax to generate funds for educational programs. The estimated \$445 million was to go towards increasing teacher's base salaries, performance pay, and site chosen classroom initiatives. Later, in 2012, House Bill 2823 was adopted. This bill required that by the 13-14 school year, a teacher's performance evaluation be a portion of the performance pay system as required by proposition 301.

## Kentucky

In 2002 Kentucky House Bill 402 authorized a pilot to test differentiated teacher compensation. The goal of this pilot was to, "increase the supply of teachers in critical shortage areas, difficult assignments, and hard-to-fill positions; decrease the need for emergency certified teachers and to encourage teachers' self-improvement and voluntary career advancement." (Seiler, p.32) Unfortunately, since the ten pilot districts used different approaches, the data was inconclusive, showing only modest gains. While the statute permitting differentiated compensation still is in effect, funding ended in 2004 and no programs continued.

## **Maine**

Since 2007, The Portland (Maine) Education Association (PEA) has instituted the Professional Learning Based Salary System (PLBSS). This system moves educators horizontally across salary “lanes” based on their salary contact hours gained for participating in professional development opportunities and completing college courses. Changing “lanes” permanently increases their salary.

In 2011, the Portland Public School District was described as better able to retain staff as a result of PLBSS. PLBSS is credited with creating an environment that “to treat teachers like professional, encourage them to improve instructional practices, and take an increased leadership role in developing a broad culture of learning in the schools” (Long, para. 6) PEA President Kathleen Casasa, was quoted as saying, “There is a heightened sense of excitement and ownership among educators resulting in a learning environment of increased professionalism, a culture of collaboration, and improved instructional practice. Because of this collaborative partnership between the District and Portland Education Association, Portland schools are able to attract and retain highly qualified teachers.” (Long, para. 8)

## **Studies of School Systems that have Implemented Teacher Performance Incentives**

### **Nashville, Tennessee:**

#### **National Center on Performance Incentives: Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT)**

POINT was a three-year study conducted in the Metropolitan Nashville school system from 2006-07 through 2008-09. The experiment was designed to determine if appropriate incentives provided to teachers would result in improved student performance outcomes.

Over the three year period, this study looked at middle school math teachers who voluntarily participated in a controlled experiment to assess the effect of financial rewards for teachers whose students showed unusually large gains on standardized tests. The teachers decided what if anything they needed to raise student performance.

According to Springer et al. (2010), the results did not support the hypothesis that given the appropriate incentive, student performance would increase. While student scores did increase during the three year period, those students with teachers that were receiving incentives did not outperform their peers in classes taught by teachers not receiving the incentives. Finally, the authors highlight that POINT studied one particular model of incentive pay, and their negative results should not be broadened and applied to other models of compensation for educators.

## **Washington D.C.**

### **Stanford Graduate School of Education and University of Virginia Curry School of Education: IMPACT**

IMPACT was introduced in the District of Columbia Public Schools as a performance-assessment system “linking high-powered incentives and teacher evaluations.” (Donald, para. 2) Included in the plan was the immediate dismissal of teachers rated ineffective as well as sizable financial incentives for high performing teachers. High performing teachers could earn up to \$25,000 as well as a similarly large permanent increase in their salary.

According to Donald (2013), IMPACT’s teacher performance assessment is not solely based on student test scores. It also takes into account teacher observations, which occur five times a year, their support of school initiatives, their efforts to promote high expectations among students, and their demonstration of professionalism. Based on this score, teachers receive a bonus, and if they repeat their performance a second year in a row, they receive a pay increase. Conversely, if an educator is ranked ineffective they are dismissed. Minimally effective teachers have one year to become effective.

Interestingly, the results of this study contradicted other studies that found limited connections between teacher incentive and student achievement. Donald reported that the IMPACT program study results were positive potentially due to a comprehensive assessment of teacher performance and larger pay incentives. It was also reported that it appears that IMPACT has been viewed as a more permanent system policy among the staff; and therefore, teachers are not viewing it as something that will eventually disappear.

Finally, Donald cautioned that the implementation of an incentive program of this size may not be easy for some school systems to replicate due to the need for an integrated data system, communication and training for raters, and ongoing support for teacher improvement. Furthermore, school systems must be prepared with a plan for the recruitment of the teachers lost when identified as ineffective.

## **Denver, Colorado**

### **Independence Institute: Denver’s ProComp and Teacher Compensation Report in Colorado**

A leader in the teacher compensation movement was the Denver Public School System. In 1999, the school board and teachers association developed a pay for performance pilot based on student achievement. While the pilot was successful, developers saw the need to expand it to include all teachers and address those that worked in difficult environments. As such, a much broader Professional Compensation System for Teachers, ProComp, was developed and approved in 2005. This compensation plan replaced the traditional step model.

In 2007, the Independence Institute completed a comprehensive study on Denver’s Professional Compensation System for Teachers (ProComp). This system grew out of a four year pilot resulting in the Denver Public School System and the Denver Classroom Teachers

Association to approve ProComp in 2004. In 2005, Denver citizens voted to approve a \$25 million tax increase to implement the full plan. (DeGrow, 2007)

The Denver pay system divided its rewards into four major categories:

- *Market incentives* which incents teachers who work in challenging jobs or hard to fill positions;
- *Student growth* which provide incentives to individuals or groups of teachers who measurably help students improve classroom performance;
- *Knowledge and skills* which provides pay raises to teachers who complete relevant academic degrees national certification, or professional development projects; and
- *Professional evaluations* which attach a marginal salary increase to a teacher with a satisfactory evaluation.

While DeGrow (2007) acknowledged that Denver Public Schools should be recognized for attempts at reforming its salary schedule, the research was not promising for the effectiveness of group rewards or for the value of advanced credentials. It was reported that the chief weakness of ProComp is that the rewards for student growth are small when compared to the range of other possible bonuses.

Today, ProComp is still in place and the Denver Public Schools are proud of its groundbreaking reform, stating:

“ProComp is particularly distinctive because DPS and the Denver Classroom Teachers Association (DCTA) collaborated to develop, build, and test the program. ProComp’s design is also unique, interlinking these central ingredients for impacting student achievement:

- Best practices in teaching and learning
- Tools and data for measuring student growth
- Knowledgeable and motivated professional staff
- Evaluation of teaching practices.” (Denver Public Schools Website, About ProComp (2015)

### **Evaluation of the Teacher Incentive Fund: Implementation and Impacts of Pay-for-Performance**

#### **National Center for Educational Evaluation: Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF)**

In 2006, Congress established the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) which was designed to provide grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The four components of the performance based compensation systems needed to include measures of educator effectiveness, pay-for-performance bonus, additional pay opportunities, and professional development. By 2010, sixty-two grants were awarded.

In September 2015, the two year study of the TIF Grant awards was released. In general, the findings illustrated difficulty with implementation and sustainability (Chiang, p. ES-1). Main findings for ten evaluation districts found that: “Few evaluation districts structured pay-for performance bonuses to align with the TIF grant guidance; educator’s understanding of key program components improved in the second year, but many teachers still misunderstood whether they were eligible for performance bonuses or the amount they could earn; and pay-for-performance had a small positive impact on students’ reading achievement but impacts on math achievement were not significant” (Chiang, p.ES1-ES2)

The effects of TIF grants will continue to be studied though the 5-year grant period.

**Conclusions:**

Despite the number of systems that have attempted teacher compensation reform, the reviews are still mixed regarding their effectiveness. What the Race to the Top Performance Compensation Workgroup found was that research tells us that performance based compensation plans are effective when they:

- Align with vertical goals of the organization and are part of a larger reform effort;
- Align with the horizontal policies and practices of the organization, including teacher training and professional development;
- Use terms, design features, specific measures of performance and reward consistently and with transparency so that they are clearly defined and understood by all;
- Build upon multiple measures of performance that are fair and transparent;
- Reward individual, school and local school system effort;
- Establish early and broad stakeholder support by involving stakeholders in the design and implementation of the plan, which may require the development of a communication plan;
- Ensure stakeholder confidence that the process of determining appropriate compensation initiative will be carried out carefully and accurately; and,
- Are adequately funded with no caps on the number of employees who can receive the award and there is an expectation that the local school system can afford to sustain the plan.

Furthermore, the research tells us that compensation drivers should be structured to be consistent with the reform initiatives and overall goals. This is why we are recommending that

Maryland consider a different approach to school improvement, and take a careful look at some of the evidence-based options suggested in the P-20 Teacher Education Task Force Report and JCR R75T00.

Student achievement should include both student growth and student attainment models. Recruitment should include both new employees and recruitment for certain hard-to-staff schools and subject areas. New employees are more receptive to performance based compensation as well as signing bonuses and indirect compensation. Local school systems should be prepared to explore differential and/or market pay incentives for the hard to staff schools and subject areas. Finally, compressing the single salary scale to provide higher compensation in the earlier years may positively impact both retention and student achievement since teacher effectiveness is most evident in the first five years of teaching.



## Recommendation

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The MSDE staff has been exploring what data is available to create new criteria to design other grant programs to improve teacher quality. MSDE has also worked with the P-20 Teacher Education Task Force to research additional models for designing grant programs to improve teacher quality, teacher retention and student achievement.

Given that Maryland has transitioned from the Maryland State Curriculum to the College and Career Readiness Standards and is transitioning from the Maryland School Assessments to Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC), it is recommended that PARCC assessment data be used for reviewing status and progress in low performing schools. PARCC assessment data from 2015 administration is being released this fall and early winter. Additionally, given that the accountability system related to the PARCC assessments is not fully developed, it is not presently possible to utilize the data from the 2015 administration for use with the administration of the QTI grants for the 2015-2016 school year.

Since the PARCC data is in its infancy, we suggest that before making final recommendations for the best approaches to the QTI grants, the Department be given an additional year to analyze the new assessment data. In addition to utilizing new data, MSDE will work with a diverse group of stakeholders to further develop the options that may include other models for teacher support beyond the current focus on stipends. MSDE notes that the establishment of early and broad stakeholder investment is critical in designing and implementing teacher incentives.

Given that the accountability system for PARCC data is in the process of development, MSDE recommends for FY 2017 that the same criteria used for the incentives in FY 2016 (reverting back to FY 2014 criteria) be applied.

MSDE is making the following recommendations for consideration for FY 2018 and beyond:

1. MSDE recommends continuing the current model but adopting more relevant criteria for performance based stipends to any English/Language Arts and Math teachers in a comprehensive needs school, provided that the school shows progress; **or**
2. Creating a new set of alternatives for the QTI funds, based on a comprehensive study to determine teacher impact for School Year 2016-17. A broad-based stakeholder group would be charged to develop a comprehensive plan with recommendations for implementation in Fiscal Year 2018. These recommendations could include a range of high Return on Investment (ROI) programs, including loan forgiveness, induction support, career ladders,

collaboratively developed professional development opportunities with higher education and industries, school or Local Education Agency-based stipends, and other evidence-based options suggested in the P-20 Teacher Education Task Force Report and JCR R75T00.

Finally, statutory language relating to teacher incentives would need to be amended in accordance with any of the recommendations outlined above.

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